---
sourceDocument: Australia Platform security
sourceDocumentLink: https://servicenow-prod.fluidtopics.net/r/de-DE/platform-security

 Release :

    - australia

ft:locale :

    - de-DE

ft:publication_title :

    - Australia Platform security

ft:clusterId :

    - psec

bundleId :

    - psec

workflow :

    - Platform


---

# Prevent Users From Accepting Warning To Bypass CSRF Validation \[Updated in Security Center 1.3 and 1.5\]

# Prevent Users From Accepting Warning To Bypass CSRF Validation \[Updated in Security Center
1.3 and 1.5\] {#ariaid-title1}

* Freigeben Version: Australia
* 
* Aktualisiert 12. März 2026
* 
* ![](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/portal-asset/ico-clock) 2 Minuten Lesedauer

Use the glide.security.csrf.strict.validation.mode property to
enable CSRF token strict validation. If the CSRF token doesn't match, it prevents resubmission
of the request.
This property prevents users from being able to accept a warning which allows a potentially
malicious request to be sent to the instance. This warning appears when a POST request fails
due to having a mis-matched anti-CSRF token belonging to one of the victim's other active
sessions. If glide.security.csrf.strict.validation.mode is not set to
the recommended value of true, then an attacker can formulate a CSRF attack utilizing a
leaked anti-CSRF token from a different active session belonging to the victim. A POST
request to an instance contains an anti-CSRF token within "sysparm_ck" or "X-UserToken"
which matches the user's current session.

If the anti-CSRF token is instead tied to one of the user's other active sessions, the POST
request will return a 302 redirection to security_interceptor.do with a Continue button
available to the user when this property is set to false. Clicking this button will
re-submit the request to the instance, except it will now having a valid anti-CSRF token.
When this property is set to true, the 302 redirection to the security_interceptor.do page
will not display a Continue button and the user will not be allowed to resubmit the
request.A successful CSRF attack will allow an attacker to effectively perform any operation
that the victim is able to perform.

## More information {#sc-csrf-strict-validation__section_more_information}

{#sc-csrf-strict-validation__table_ajc_b43_3kb__entry__2}

| Attribute | Description |
|-|-|
| Property name | glide.security.csrf.strict.validation.mode |
| Configuration type | System Properties (/sys_properties_list.do) |
| Category | [Access control](https://servicenow-prod.fluidtopics.net/xAmazkRh5FKyeb7q4TQGWw "The access control category audits the process of protecting resources from unauthorized access through granting and denying requests based on a permission model. This includes ensuring an entity accessing a resource holds valid credentials to do so, creating and protecting a well-defined set of roles or permissions and ensuring role or permission controls are protected from replay and tampering.") |
| Purpose | To enforce strict validation of CSRF token, and prevents its reuse. |
| Data type | Boolean |
| Recommended value | true |
| Default value | true |
| Security risk rating | (Medium) Cross site Request Forgery is a significant security risk that violates the integrity of the instance data. An attacker can launch the CSRF attack on any instance user by abusing the trust of the instance user. With the help of social engineering attacks, a user can submit a malformed request to the instance on behalf of the attacker. |
| Security risk rating | 3.7 |
| Functional impact | This remediation enables an extra validation step before the instance user submits a write request to the instance. It checks whether the current CSRF token has been used previously. If Yes, it prevents submission of further write requests. |
| Security risk | (Medium) Cross site Request Forgery is a significant security risk that violates the integrity of the instance data. An attacker can launch the CSRF attack on any instance user by abusing the trust of the instance user. With the help of social engineering attacks, a user can submit a malformed request to the instance on behalf of the attacker. |
[ ]

{#sc-csrf-strict-validation__table_ajc_b43_3kb}

Return to [Configure and upload your customer supplied key](https://servicenow-prod.fluidtopics.net/EI6~rDwd7ENC_Q_Px6k0JQ "You can use your own customer-supplied key instead of using the ServiceNow system-generated keys.") to upload your wrapped key.